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In Language, culture, and mind: Natural constructions and social kinds, anthropol-
ogist Paul Kockelman delivers a master class in modern linguistic anthropology. As
he explains in his overview of the book, Kockelman employs five “core techniques.”
First, the chosen conceptual domains are described on all their levels—morphosyn-
tactic, semantic, pragmatic, discourse distribution, and frequency—while doing
“justice to the particulars.” Second, the focus of interest is studied not only
through the referential and expressive functions of language, but in terms of other
functions as well (poetic, etc.). Third, context and the iconic/indexical nature of
language are assumed to be no less important than the symbolic aspects of language.
Fourth, there is a focus on how speakers interpret one set of structures in terms of
another, both demonstrating and exploiting the reflexivity and system-internal struc-
ture of language. Fifth, says Kockelman, “each chapter pairs a grammatical category
with a psychological theme,” including emotions and personhood. These five core
techniques, or at least the first four, should be recognizable to any linguistic anthro-
pologist as sine quibus non of the business of this field. But seldom do we see this
gold standard being genuinely met. Kockelman not only specifies what it would
take to nail an analysis of the relations between language, culture, and mind, he
actually does it. He delivers on all five promises.
In five substantive chapters, presented between pithy introductory and con-
cluding bookends, Kockelman “examines mind through the lens of language
and culture” (2). The chosen means to this end is a solidly constructed account
of a set of complementary aspects of the semiotic—mostly linguistic—practices
of Q’eqchi’ speakers in a Mayan village of remote highland Guatemala. Kockel-
man does not fear the complexities of semantic systems and grammatical typolo-
gies, nor does he shy away from the rich details of ethnographic context. Nor,
especially, is he afraid to confront cognition. It is common to find the words
language, culture, and mind strung together as in the unfortunately bland title
of this book, but it is rare to find all three of these pillars shored up to the same
very firm degree.
In Ch. 2, Kockelman discusses inalienable possession in Q’eqchi’, working
systematically through the grammatical, semantic, pragmatic, and discursive
levels of this domain. He shows that there is a “particularly strong resonance”
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(32) between local ontology of the person as manifest in a range of measures
related to inalienable possession: cognition, cultural practice, patterns of fre-
quency of reference in discourse, semantics, and patterns of grammatical
marking. He shows that the category of inalienable possessions, measured in
these multiple ways, can deliver a cartography of personhood, including the
fused personhood of couples, with their maximally overlapping sets of posses-
sions. Importantly, Kockelman does not claim that one or another of these
measures is primary (34). They presumably all provide important data to the
child in socialization who is striving to acquire a synchronic idiolect of a
complex sociocultural system, and thereby to attain membership in that
system. Kockelman points out, however, that from certain temporal-causal per-
spectives, including diachrony and enchrony, asymmetries in the form of depen-
dencies among the various measures become visible. He hypothesizes that the
semantic and grammatical patterns are “ultimately the result of” the discourse
patterns, and that the discourse patterns in turn result from “both relatively wide-
spread cognitive processes and relatively localized cultural practices” (34). The
result is a rare, causally plausible account of ethnosyntax that is not vulnerable to
the fatal flaws often found in grammar-culture work (see Enfield 2002a:18 for
discussion of a “linkage problem” in claims of relations between grammar and
culture; cf. Simpson 2002; Evans 2003).
Ch. 3 focuses on complement-taking predicates in Q’eqchi’. Again we are
treated to a systematic account of the semantic and grammatical details of the
Q’eqchi’ system for joining predicates together in complex structures. Kockelman
examines the full set of complement-taking predicates, working through the fam-
iliar categories of temporal-aspectual predicates (“begin to,” etc.), predicates of
cognition (“think that,” etc.), and of speaking (“say that,” etc.), then digging into
the relative tightness of the different semantic classes of complement-taking predi-
cates, as defined by their morphological behavior and things like operator scope and
other distinguishing measures of interclausal relations. After this general discus-
sion, firmly grounded in the context of syntactic typology, Kockelman goes
deeper into one class of complement-taking predicates that was introduced in
Ch. 2, namely the “possessed-heart constructions.” These structures, found in
languages around the world (Enfield & Wierzbicka 2002), use a reference of
some kind to the heart or other bodily seat of the emotions to predicate emotional
experiences; for instance, in one of the Q’eqchi’ examples, “to have a leveled heart”
means “to be content.” I have elsewhere described my reservations about the
relation between synchrony and diachrony here (Enfield 2002b), namely, Can we
be sure that speakers of this language have a ‘live’ understanding of the ‘heart’
metaphor?
Ch. 4 looks at how the linguistic expression of time is organized and tracked
in Q’eqchi’, with reference to an exhaustive study of a historical text “The mar-
riage between the sun and the moon.” (The full text is supplied as an appendix.)
The aim is to use temporality’s expression as a key for getting into
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intersubjectivity. This is done with reference to an ingenious system of descrip-
tion of temporal-aspectual relations, drawing on the early semantics of Reichen-
bach (1947), extended later by Bull (1960) and Klein (1994), and expressing
these in terms of Jakobson’s taxonomy of “events” (90–92), then using these
to explicate a rich set of temporal expressions in Q’eqchi’. With characteristic ex-
haustiveness, Kockelman traces interconnections between the key themes of tem-
porality, intentionality, ontology, and causality, using temporal relations and
their grammatical realization as a window onto the cognitive ethnography of
“theory of mind.” He concludes that “while it is tempting to reify theories of
mind, or even ethnopsychologies, as relatively isolated and self-contained
domains, we see here that theories of mind are impossible to separate from
religious beliefs, taxonomic reasoning, social hierarchies, and ‘culture’ more
generally” (88).
Ch. 5 focuses on a set of bound grammatical markers that form a system for
specifying modality and status, in the grammatical senses of these terms,
using this as an access point to examine stance. Kockelman works systematically
through the morphosyntactic, semantic, and pragmatic properties of the modal
clitics, with rich exemplification of each one: an afactive status marker, an opta-
tive status marker, a factive status marker, and a counterfactive status marker.
Much of the analysis is done in Jakobsonian terms, relating speech event (Es)
to narrated event (En) in various ways, enriched by the inclusion of Ec (“commit-
ment event”) and Ers (“reported speech event”) in addition. He concludes the
chapter with a defining statement on the nature of stance, though given its
highly presupposing nature it may have stanceologists doing creative exegesis
for years to come.
Ch. 6 moves to the other end of the grammatical core, to look at interjections.
As a form class, interjections are at the opposite end of the scale from the modal
clitics, being entirely nonembedded syntactically. Interjections form utterances
of their own. Their distributional context is not so much grammatical as enchro-
nic, occurring as moves all of their own, engendered by, and engendering, other
moves. With extended examples, as is necessary for these highly context-
grounded things, Kockelman examines the cognitive content of interjections
by studying their relations to the metalinguistic usages of complement-taking
predicates in the cognitive domain such as “desire,” “fear,” and “know.” What
follows is a rich exposition of the meanings of interjections, both generally
and with specific reference to a Q’eqchi’ set of forms. There is detailed and
extensive discussion of their usage in context, and their relative frequencies of
use. Kockelman gives special attention to the value of exploiting language’s
reflexive potential, here by studying the relation between two distinct semanti-
co-grammatical systems, one used by natives as a device for explicating the
other. As he summarizes it, “by moving between typology and description
(general and particular), and between signification and interpretation (language
and metalanguage), the identities and differences between the levels of
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description and the domains described were evinced” (201). Here is where we
see the story coming back around to the simple but powerful neo-Piercean
semiotic framework that underlies the entire project (see the opening and
closing chapters), a framework that insists not merely on studying relations,
but relations between relations (cf. Kockelman 2011): “If human beings are
indeed those entities whose agency is both enabled and constrained by the
fact that their practices and their representations of practices are never commen-
surate, then the relevant locus for cross-cultural comparison should not be a set
of practices, nor a set of representations (of practices), but rather such relation-
ships between the two” (201).
What I especially wish to applaud is Kockelman’s demonstration in this book
that cognition is no more mysterious or unobservable than social status. He states
on p. 7 that “mental states are no more ‘private’ than social statuses,” meaning
that we use fundamentally the same semiotic logic to conclude that a person “is
afraid” as we do to conclude that somebody “is a waiter.” It concerns the signs
that this person gives and gives off. Here Kockelman strikes to the heart of a
current, sometimes heated issue, in research on language use. Some authors
worry that we should not speculate about cognition because cognition is not ac-
cessible. Here is Kockelman’s retort in the conclusion: “a domain that at first
seems to be the most private and invisible (mind) was rendered both empirically
tractable and widely comparable by reference to the cultural processes and
linguistic practices that mediate it. Stances, then, provide a public face
for, and a social perspective on, the inferential and indexical processes that
constitute the essence of intentionality, one of the defining characteristics of
mind” (208).
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